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Note
STATE V. THOMAS: AN IMPROPER EXTENSION OF
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER TO COMBAT
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
DANIEL P. MOONEY*
In State v. Thomas, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether Patrick Joseph Thomas’s conviction for gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter should be upheld based on evidence that Thomas
sold heroin to a buyer who later overdosed on the supply. 2 The court upheld
Thomas’s conviction, holding sufficient evidence existed to satisfy both the
gross negligence and causation prongs of gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter. 3 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court improperly
relied on another State’s precedent to reach its conclusion and failed to
account for important facts that would have greatly affected its legal
causation analysis. 4 Further, the court did not consider Maryland’s assisted
suicide statute, which renders the court’s decision illogical. 5 Finally, the
court went against the Maryland General Assembly’s clear decision to
prohibit the State of Maryland from prosecuting narcotics distributors for
manslaughter. 6 Therefore, the court erred in its analysis of both prongs of
gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, wrongfully concluding that
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1. 464 Md. 133, 153, 211 A.3d 274, 285 (2019).
2. Id. at 153, 211 A.3d at 285.
3. Id. at 172, 211 A.3d at 297.
4. See infra Section IV.A.
5. See infra Section IV.B.
6. See infra Section IV.C.
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Thomas exhibited gross negligence 7 and was the legal cause of the buyer’s
death. 8
I. THE CASE
In the early morning hours of June 26, 2015, Colton Lee Matrey
contacted Patrick Joseph Thomas approximately thirty times in an attempt to
engage in a drug transaction. 9 Thomas eventually responded to Matrey’s
inquiries and sold Matrey four bags of heroin. 10 A few hours later, Matrey
was found deceased in his bathroom surrounded by “four empty, white wax
paper bags stamped ‘Banshee’ in blue with a blue emblem” containing
suspected heroin residue. 11 In addition, upon searching Matrey’s bedroom,
the police found a prescription pill bottle containing six fifty-milligram
tramadol pills that Matrey allegedly stole from his mother. 12 Tramadol is an
opioid analgesic that, similar to heroin, metabolizes into free morphine in the
human body. 13 The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner could only
determine the cause instead of the manner of death, opining, “Colton Lee
Matrey died of alcohol and narcotic (free morphine) intoxication. . . .
Autopsy detected increased levels of alcohol and a drug (free morphine) in
the heart blood of the deceased.” 14
Using Matrey’s cell phone, detectives identified Thomas as the person
who Matrey was contacting on the morning of his death. 15 Acting on this
information, officers executed a search and seizure warrant on Thomas’s
person and residence, resulting in the seizure of “[sixty] individual white wax
paper bags . . . stamped [‘Banshee’] in blue, with a blue emblem.” 16
Detectives then interviewed Thomas, at which point Thomas admitted to both
using and selling heroin on a regular basis. 17 Specifically, Thomas explained
he personally used an average of twelve bags of heroin per day, broken down

7. See infra Section IV.A.
8. See infra Section IV.B.1.
9. Thomas v. State, 237 Md. App. 527, 530–31, 186 A.3d 857, 859 (2018), rev’d, 464 Md.
133, 211 A.3d 274 (2019).
10. Id. at 531, 186 A.3d at 859.
11. Id., 186 A.3d at 859–60.
12. Id., 186 A.3d at 860.
13. Id. at 531 nn.4–5, 186 A.3d at 860 nn. 4–5. “Analgesic” is defined as “an agent producing
diminished sensation to pain without loss of consciousness; a drug that is used to relive pain and
https://www.merriamproduce
analgesia.”
Analgesic,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
webster.com/dictionary/analgesic (last visited July 30, 2019).
14. Thomas, 237 Md. App. at 531, 186 A.3d at 860.
15. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 144, 211 A.3d 274, 280 (2019).
16. Id. at 145, 211 A.3d at 281.
17. Id. at 148, 211 A.3d at 283.

2020]

STATE V. THOMAS

773

into three shots of four bags each. 18 When asked about the details of June
26, Thomas admitted to selling Matrey four bags of heroin because he knew
Matrey was a local heroin addict.19 Thomas, however, was shocked to hear
of Matrey’s death, claiming “[Matrey] couldn’t have overdosed off what I
sold him. I only sold him four bags.” 20
Thomas was charged in the Circuit Court for Worcester County with
heroin distribution, reckless endangerment, and involuntary manslaughter
under theories of unlawful act manslaughter and grossly negligent
manslaughter. 21 He pleaded not guilty and was tried upon an agreed
statement of facts before being convicted of all three counts.22 Thomas was
then sentenced to twenty years for distribution to run concurrent to an
additional ten years for manslaughter. 23 Thomas timely appealed the circuit
court’s decision, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to sustain
his manslaughter conviction. 24
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered Thomas’s
conviction under both the unlawful act and grossly negligent theories of
involuntary manslaughter. 25 The court held Thomas was not liable for
involuntary manslaughter under the unlawful act variant because “the State
failed to establish a causal connection between Thomas’s sale of heroin and
18. Id.
19. Id. at 149, 211 A.3d at 283.
20. Id. at 150, 211 A.3d at 283.
21. Thomas v. State, 237 Md. App. 527, 529–33, 186 A.3d 857, 859–61 (2018), rev’d, 464
Md. 133, 211 A.3d 274 (2019). Unlawful act manslaughter has three elements:
(1) that the defendant or another participating in the crime with the defendant committed
or attempted to commit an eligible crime; (2) that the defendant or another participating
in the crime killed the victim; and (3) that the act resulting in the death of the victim
occurred during the commission, attempted commission, or the escape from the
immediate scene of the eligible crime.
Id. at 533, 186 A.3d at 861 (quoting Bowers v. State, 227 Md. App. 310, 314 n.4, 133 A.3d 1254,
1257 n.4 (2016)). Further, “[t]he State must prove that the defendant’s unlawful act was the legal
cause of the victim’s death.” Id. at 535, 186 A.3d at 862.
Grossly negligent manslaughter “occurs when a defendant acts in a manner that is grossly
negligent and causes the death of another,” wherein the act is “so heedless and incautious as
necessarily to be deemed unlawful and wanton, manifesting such a gross departure from what would
be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to
furnish evidence of an indifference to consequences.” Id. at 536–37, 186 A.3d at 863 (quoting State
v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 500, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (1994)). In addition, “the defendant’s gross
negligence must be the proximate cause of the victim’s death—meaning the (1) actual, but-for cause
and (2) legal cause.” Thomas, 464 Md. at 173, 211 A.3d at 297–98.
22. Thomas, 237 Md. App. at 530–31, 186 A.3d at 859. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
terms this a “hybrid plea,” wherein the ultimate facts are agreed upon by both parties, but “the ability
to argue legal issues, as well as sufficiency,” is maintained. Thomas, 464 Md. at 140, 211 A.3d at
278 (quoting Bishop v. State, 417 Md. 1, 22, 7 A.3d 1074, 1086–87 (2010)).
23. Thomas, 237 Md. App. at 531, 186 A.3d at 860.
24. Id. at 531–32, 186 A.3d at 860.
25. Id. at 532–33, 186 A.3d at 860–61.
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Matrey’s death.” 26 In addition, the court held Thomas was not liable under
the grossly negligent theory because (1) the State only established evidence
of ordinary negligence as opposed to gross negligence, and (2) the State failed
to satisfy the requirement that Thomas’s “act be the legal—‘but-for’—cause
of [Matrey’s] death.” 27 As a result, the Court of Special Appeals reversed
Thomas’s manslaughter conviction. 28
The State of Maryland petitioned the Court of Appeals for writ of
certiorari, arguing “that the evidence was sufficient to convict Thomas of
grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter.” 29 Notably, the State did not
challenge the Court of Special Appeals’ decision surrounding unlawful act
involuntary manslaughter. 30 Thus, in granting certiorari, the Court of
Appeals only considered “whether the evidence introduced in the trial court
was sufficient to convict Thomas of gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter.” 31
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Until the State v. Thomas decision, Maryland courts had never
considered whether an individual can be convicted of gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter for drug distribution. 32 Thus, to understand State
v. Thomas, one must understand involuntary manslaughter and the precedent
surrounding the crime in Maryland. 33 Section II.A discusses Maryland’s
definition of involuntary manslaughter and the three varieties Maryland
courts recognize. 34 Section II.B describes the development of the gross

26. Id. at 535–36, 186 A.3d at 862. The court explained Matrey injected himself with an
amount of heroin that he chose at a different time and place from Thomas’s heroin sale. Id. at 535,
186 A.3d at 862. In addition, Matrey used the heroin in combination with alcohol, which potentially
intensified the heroin’s effect. Id.
27. Id. at 536–37, 186 A.3d at 863. The court did not conduct an additional causation analysis,
but instead referenced its conclusion under the unlawful act theory to show the casual chain was
broken between Thomas’s sale and Matrey’s death. Id. at 537, 186 A.3d at 863.
28. Id. at 539, 186 A.3d at 864. The Court of Special Appeals did not address Thomas’s
distribution conviction because Thomas only challenged his manslaughter conviction. Id. at 530,
186 A.3d at 859.
29. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 153, 211 A.3d 274, 285 (2019).
30. Id.
31. Id. In addressing this question, the Court of Appeals accepted “the parties agreed ‘ultimate
facts’ and ‘simply appl[ied] the law to the facts agreed upon.’” Id. at 151–52, 211 A.3d at 285
(quoting Taylor v. State, 388 Md. 385, 396–97, 879 A.2d 1074, 1081 (2004)). Thus, the court asked
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 152,
211 A.3d at 285 (quoting State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479, 649 A.2d 336, 338 (1994)).
32. See infra Section II.B.
33. See infra Sections II.A–II.D.
34. See infra Section II.A.
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negligence standard in Maryland. 35 Section II.C defines the “actual” and
“legal” causation prongs of involuntary manslaughter under Maryland law.36
Finally, Section II.D analyzes other states’ applications of gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter to cases involving drug distribution. 37
A. Maryland’s Definition of Involuntary Manslaughter
In Maryland, involuntary manslaughter is a common law felony that is
not defined by statute. 38 Instead, it is “generally defined as an unintentional
killing done without malice.” 39 The State recognizes three varieties of the
crime, each of which is distinguished by the actions that cause the death,
including: “(1) by doing some unlawful act endangering life but which does
not amount to a felony, or (2) in negligently doing some act lawful in itself,
or (3) by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.” 40 The first two
varieties of involuntary manslaughter are deemed “unlawful act” involuntary
manslaughter and “gross negligence” involuntary manslaughter,
respectively. 41 State v. Thomas only concerns the second variety—gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter. 42 To support a conviction under this
category, the defendant’s negligence must be “gross or criminal,” and there
must be “[a] causal connection between such gross negligence and death.”43
To determine if a defendant’s negligence is “gross,” the court asks “whether
the [defendant’s] conduct, ‘under the circumstances, amounted to a disregard
of the consequences which might ensue and indifference to the rights of
others, and so was a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.’” 44 In
other words, the defendant’s act must “manifest[] such a gross departure from
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under
35. See infra Section II.B.
36. See infra Section II.C.
37. See infra Section II.D.
38. See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 499, 649 A.2d 336, 347 (1994) (analyzing involuntary
manslaughter in the context of a police-involved shooting).
39. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing the sentencing
guidelines for “manslaughter,” but making no distinction between voluntary manslaughter and
involuntary manslaughter).
40. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499, 649 A.2d at 347 (quoting Cox v. State, 311 Md. 326, 331–32,
534 A.2d 1333, 1335–36 (1988)).
41. See Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196, 199–200, 282 A.2d 147, 149 (1971) (upholding a
teenager’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter after determining the teenager was grossly
negligent in bringing a loaded gun to a school dance where he accidentally shot and killed someone).
42. See supra Section I.
43. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499, 649 A.2d at 348 (quoting Mills, 13 Md. App. at 199–200, 282
A.2d at 149); see id. (“[W]hether an accused’s conduct constituted gross negligence must be
determined by the conduct itself and not by the resultant harm.” (quoting Mills, 13 Md. App. at 200,
282 A.2d at 149)).
44. Id. at 500, 649 A.2d at 348 (quoting Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 590, 102 A.2d 277, 280
(1954)).
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the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of an indifference to
consequences.” 45 Further, to satisfy the causation prong, the State must prove
both actual and legal causation. 46
B. Development of Maryland’s Gross Negligence Standard
In developing the gross negligence standard, Maryland courts, prior to
Thomas, primarily addressed four contexts: (1) automobiles, (2) failure to
perform a duty, (3) weapons, and (4) police officers. 47 As it currently stands,
the caselaw does not reveal a bright line rule distinguishing gross negligence
from ordinary negligence. 48 Instead, whether conduct is grossly negligent is
a fact-dependent inquiry where courts are expected to look at the
dangerousness of the person’s conduct alongside the relevant environmental
factors. 49
1. Automobiles
The Maryland Criminal Law Article defines vehicular manslaughter as
“caus[ing] the death of another as a result of the person’s driving, operating,
or controlling a vehicle or vessel in a grossly negligent manner.” 50 The Court
of Appeals, however, holds the “common law concept and meaning of gross
negligence” is carried into the statute. 51 Thus, in the context of vehicular
manslaughter, Maryland courts apply the common law gross negligence
standard, considering both the environment and the speed at which a driver
is traveling in determining whether the driver exhibited gross negligence. 52
For example, in Duren v. State, 53 the Court of Appeals upheld a driver’s
conviction of vehicular manslaughter after determining the driver exhibited
gross negligence by driving at approximately sixty miles per hour in a highly
populated business and residential area. 54
45. Id.
46. See infra Section II.C.
47. See infra Sections II.B.1–4.
48. See infra Section II.B.4.
49. Id.
50. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-209(b) (LexisNexis 2012).
51. Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 588, 102 A.2d 277, 279 (1954) (citing Hughes v. State, 198
Md. 424, 431, 84 A.2d 419, 422 (1951)); see supra Section II.A.
52. Duren, 203 Md. at 591, 102 A.2d at 280.
53. 203 Md. 584, 102 A.2d 277 (1954).
54. Duren, 203 Md. at 594, 102 A.2d at 282; see also State v. Kramer, 318 Md. 576, 586–93,
569 A.2d 674, 679–82 (1990) (holding the evidence was legally sufficient for the jury to find a
driver guilty of vehicular manslaughter after the driver passed another vehicle in a no-pass zone and
struck an oncoming vehicle head on). But see Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 534, 132 A.2d 853,
856 (1957) (holding there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant was grossly
negligent based on the normal speed of the driver’s vehicle and the relatively safe environment in
which he was driving).
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2. Failure to Perform a Duty
Gross negligence for failing to perform a duty arises in cases “where the
defendant owed to a deceased person a specific legal duty, but failed to
perform the same.” 55 If “death resulted to the deceased because of the
nonperformance of the duty, (at least under circumstances where the failure
to perform constituted gross and wanton negligence) the defendant is guilty
of involuntary manslaughter.” 56 In Palmer v. State, 57 a mother failed to stop
her boyfriend from brutally beating her infant child over a long period of
time, eventually leading to the child’s death.58 The Court of Appeals held
that because the mother owed a duty to her child to keep the child alive, the
mother’s actions of permitting and compelling the child to remain in a
severely abusive environment 59 satisfied the gross negligence standard. 60
3. Weapons
Maryland courts categorize involuntary manslaughter by firearm as
“plainly a grossly negligent act dangerous to life.” 61 In Mills v. State, 62 the
Court of Special Appeals upheld a teenager’s conviction of gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter after the teenager brought a loaded gun to a school
dance and accidentally killed one of his friends. 63 The court considered
factors such as the confined space in which the teenager furnished the
firearm, the number of people present when the teenager produced the
weapon, the teenager’s consumption of alcohol while inspecting the gun, and
the teenager’s actions that caused the firearm to fall to the ground and
discharge. 64 Factors such as these exemplify the fact-intensive analysis
courts go through in determining whether a specific defendant acted in a
grossly negligent manner. 65

55. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 343, 164 A.2d 467, 468–69 (1960) (citing Craig v. State,
220 Md. 590, 596, 155 A.2d 684, 688 (1959)).
56. Id.
57. 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960).
58. Id. at 348, 164 A.2d at 471.
59. The court provides a detailed description of the abuse the mother’s boyfriend performed
on the child for more than one month. Id. at 345–51, 164 A.2d at 469–73. He beat, whipped, and
bit the child, which caused the child’s internal organs to fail and eventually led to her death. Id.
60. Id. at 351, 164 A.2d at 473.
61. Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196, 202, 282 A.2d 147, 150 (1971).
62. 13 Md. App. 196, 282 A.2d 147 (1971).
63. Id. at 202, 282 A.2d at 150.
64. Id. at 197, 282 A.2d at 147–48.
65. See id. at 201–02, 282 A.2d at 149–50 (providing examples of the factors courts consider
when deciding whether an individual acted in a grossly negligent manner).
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4. Police Officers
When Maryland courts consider gross negligence in the context of
police officers, “the reasonableness of the conduct must be evaluated not
from the perspective of a reasonable civilian but rather from the perspective
of a reasonable police officer similarly situated.” 66 Other than this minor
difference, a court’s analysis of the gross negligence standard in the context
of police officers is identical to the analysis in cases surrounding civilians’
actions. 67 In State v. Albrecht, 68 an officer pointed his shotgun at an unarmed
suspect in front of an occupied public park, racked the weapon, and fired it
directly at the suspect, killing her instantly. 69 Based on these actions, the
Court of Appeals held the police officer’s conduct met the gross negligence
standard and reinstated the officer’s convictions of involuntary manslaughter
and reckless endangerment. 70
***
As exemplified by the four categories above, determining gross
negligence is entirely fact-dependent. 71 Maryland courts consider the
dangerousness of a defendant’s actions from the perspective of an ordinarily
prudent person or law enforcement officer in combination with the relevant
environmental factors to determine whether the defendant’s actions are
“likely at any moment to bring harm to another.” 72 In other words, the abovementioned categories provide guidance for what Maryland courts consider in
determining culpability, but the courts have not yet defined one bright-line
rule for determining gross negligence.
C. The Causation Prong of Involuntary Manslaughter
To support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter,
“[a] causal connection between such gross negligence and death must
66. State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 501, 649 A.2d 336, 349 (1994) (citing Albrecht v. State,
97 Md. App. 630, 642, 632 A.2d 163, 169 (1993)).
67. Id. at 500, 649 A.2d at 348.
68. 336 Md. 475, 649 A.2d 336 (1994).
69. Id. at 505, 649 A.2d at 350–51.
70. Id. But see State v. Pagotto, 361 Md. 528, 554–55, 762 A.2d 97, 111 (2000) (distinguishing
Albrecht and holding that an officer’s conduct in shooting a suspect as judged by a reasonable officer
standard was not as unwarranted, unsafe, or likely to cause injury or death when compared to the
officer in Albrecht because (1) the officer’s gun had no alterations, (2) there was no evidence the
officer pointed his gun at the victim, (3) the officer did not put his finger immediately on the trigger,
(4) the officer was dealing with a potentially dangerous individual, and (5) no one else was present
during the officer’s interaction with the victim).
71. See supra Sections II.B.1–4.
72. Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 533, 132 A.2d 853, 856 (1957); see, e.g., Duren v. State,
203 Md. 584, 588, 102 A.2d 277, 279 (1954) (upholding the defendant’s conviction for gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter after determining the defendant’s actions of speeding through
a highly populated area of a metropolitan city satisfied the gross negligence standard).
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exist.” 73 This requires proving (1) actual causation, meaning “but for the
antecedent[’s] conduct the result would not have occurred,” 74 and (2) legal
causation, which “turns largely upon the foreseeability of the consequence of
the defendant’s” conduct. 75
Maryland courts take a broad view of actual causation. 76 Explained
simply, “[a]ctual causation may be examined in terms of the Sine qua non,”
meaning the conduct in question must be an essential condition to the result
that occurred. 77 The Court of Appeals recognizes that a defendant’s actions
don’t have to be “the sole reason for the realization of the harm which has
been sustained by the victim.” 78 In fact, a defendant’s actions can be deemed
grossly negligent even when the victim engaged in the same grossly negligent
conduct prior to his death. 79 Further, the defendant does not have to be the
one who explicitly caused the death of the victim if the defendant “aided,
abetted, and encouraged” another participant to engage in conduct that
caused the victim’s death. 80
To prove legal causation, on the other hand, “[i]t is sufficient that the
ultimate harm is one which a reasonable man would foresee as being
reasonably related to the acts of the defendant.” 81 In Jackson v. State, 82 two
armed robbers kidnapped two hostages at gunpoint. 83 Following a car chase
with police, one of the hostages was accidentally shot and killed by a
pursuing police officer. 84 The Court of Appeals held the robbers’ “acts
themselves produced the intervening cause of [the hostage’s] death, and the
result is not to be considered remote and was foreseeable,” despite neither

73. Albrecht, 336 Md. at 499, 649 A.2d at 348.
74. Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 442, 408 A.2d 711, 718 (1979).
75. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 352, 164 A.2d 467, 474 (1960).
76. See, e.g., id. at 353, 164 A.2d at 474 (holding a defendant does not “cease to be responsible
for his otherwise criminal conduct because there were other conditions which contributed to the
same result”).
77. Jackson, 286 Md. at 442, 408 A.2d at 718; see id. at 431, 408 A.2d at 712 (holding “the
accidental killing of a hostage by a law enforcement officer attempting to apprehend robbers fleeing
from an unarmed robbery while holding the hostage at gunpoint constitutes murder in the first
degree on the part of the robbers under the Maryland felony murder statute”).
78. Id.
79. See Goldring v. State, 103 Md. App. 728, 738–39, 654 A.2d 939, 943–44 (1995) (holding
a defendant’s participation in a dangerous drag race in which the defendant’s coparticipant died was
sufficient to convict the defendant of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter even though it was
the coparticipant’s own actions that ultimately contributed to his death).
80. Alston v. State, 339 Md. 306, 321, 662 A.2d 247, 254 (1995); see id. at 307, 662 A.2d at
247 (upholding a defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder “where the victim was killed by
a shot that was fired by a man against whom the [defendant] was engaged in a gun battle”).
81. Jackson, 286 Md. at 441, 408 A.2d at 718.
82. 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
83. Id. at 433, 408 A.2d at 714.
84. Id. at 434, 408 A.2d at 714.
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robber firing the fatal shot. 85 Thus, “it is not essential that the ultimate harm
which resulted was [actually] foreseen or intended.” 86 In addition,
reasonably foreseeable intervening conduct will not relieve a defendant of
criminal culpability. 87
D. Other States’ Analyses of Involuntary Manslaughter in Cases
Involving Drug Distribution
Until State v. Thomas, the issue of whether an individual can be
convicted of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter for drug distribution
had not been considered by Maryland courts. 88 Massachusetts and North
Carolina courts, however, directly addressed this question, providing a
framework for Maryland courts to consider the issue. 89
In Commonwealth v. Catalina, 90 the defendant sold a highly potent
strain of heroin to a known addict who, in combination with alcohol, ingested
the heroin on her own accord and overdosed. 91 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts considered whether sufficient evidence existed to support
an indictment for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. 92 The
Supreme Judicial Court answered in the affirmative, stating “one can
reasonably conclude that the consumption of heroin in unknown strength is
dangerous to human life, and the administering of such a drug is inherently
dangerous.” 93 In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court noted
85. Id. at 442, 408 A.2d at 718.
86. State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 499, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (1994); see supra Section II.B.4.
87. See Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 443–44, 605 A.2d 138, 141 (1992) (upholding a reckless
endangerment conviction when the defendant, after drinking alcohol and taking drugs with the
victim, handed the victim a loaded shotgun who shot himself because of encouragement by the
defendant).
88. See supra Section II.B.
89. See Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Mass. 1990) (addressing the issue
of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter when the defendant sold a highly potent strain of
heroin to a known addict who died after ingesting a “lethal dose” of the drug in combination with
alcohol); State v. Barnes, 741 S.E.2d 457, 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (considering the necessary level
of culpability for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter when the defendant, who admitted to
nearly dying after using a specific type of methadone, sold the same type of methadone to an
individual who later overdosed on it).
90. 556 N.E.2d 973 (Mass. 1990).
91. Id. at 975.
92. Id. at 979 (explaining “involuntary manslaughter includes an unlawful homicide
unintentionally caused by wanton or reckless conduct,” wherein “[t]he essence of wanton or reckless
conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where there is a duty to
act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another”
(quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944))).
93. Id. at 980 (quoting People v. Cruciani, 334 N.Y.S.2d 515, 523 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1972)); see
also Cruciani, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 517, 524 (holding there was sufficient evidence presented to the
grand jury to support an indictment for “criminally negligent homicide” after the defendant directly
injected heroin into the victim’s arm, causing the victim’s eventual death).
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that “[t]he defendant has not yet been tried on [his] charge, so we are not
concerned with whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant a finding of his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 94 Instead, the Supreme Judicial Court only
considered “whether the information before the grand jury was adequate to
establish [the defendant’s] identity and probable cause to arrest him for the
crime charged.” 95 Therefore, in regard to its analysis of involuntary
manslaughter stemming from drug distribution, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts only reached the issue of the defendant’s indictment, not
the question of his guilt or innocence. 96
Similarly, in State v. Barnes, 97 a defendant in North Carolina sold a
known addict methadone that the defendant himself almost overdosed on one
month prior to the sale. 98 The Court of Appeals of North Carolina considered
whether the defendant could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter for
drug distribution. 99 Because the defendant sold the victim methadone that
the defendant himself nearly overdosed from one month prior, even though
no evidence was introduced to prove the defendant intended to kill the victim,
the court held “[t]his evidence would support a finding . . . of involuntary
Thus, in analyzing gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter.” 100
manslaughter surrounding drug distribution, other state courts apply a gross
negligence analysis similar to Maryland courts, wherein they reach their
decisions by considering the defendant’s actions in light of the relevant
environmental factors. 101
As discussed above, involuntary manslaughter is a common law crime
not defined by statute. 102 It requires the State to prove numerous elements,
including causation. 103 Until the State v. Thomas decision, Maryland courts
had only analyzed involuntary manslaughter in the contexts of automobiles,

94. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d at 979.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 980.
97. 741 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
98. Id. at 465.
99. Id. (explaining that “[i]n the context of involuntary manslaughter, ‘[c]ulpable negligence
is such recklessness or carelessness, proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a
thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others’”
(quoting State v. Weston, 159 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968))).
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 89, 92, 99 and accompanying text; see also State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d
124, 126 (Kan. 1974) (upholding the trial court’s dismissal of felony murder charges where the
defendant sold heroin to a person who later overdosed on it and died, explaining “the defendant’s
only connection with the homicide was that he sold a quantity of heroin to the deceased who some
time later, voluntarily and out of the presence of the defendant, injected himself with an overdose
and died as a result”).
102. See supra Section II.A.
103. See supra Section II.C.
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failing to perform a duty, weapons, and police officers. 104 Consequently,
Maryland courts had never considered involuntary manslaughter in the
context of drug distribution. 105 Other states, however, specifically
Massachusetts and North Carolina, provided guidance for the Court of
Appeals of Maryland to consider when analyzing involuntary manslaughter
resulting from drug distribution. 106
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In posing an issue of first impression, State v. Thomas required the Court
of Appeals of Maryland to determine “whether the evidence introduced in
the trial court was sufficient to convict Thomas of gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter.” 107 Judge Adkins, writing for the majority,
explained “there is sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that
Thomas’s conduct was both the actual and legal cause of [Matrey’s]
death.” 108 The court then concluded “that the record contained sufficient
evidence of gross negligence to support a conviction for gross negligence
manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.” 109 In reaching its conclusion, the
court conducted a two-prong analysis to determine whether the facts of the
case satisfied both the gross negligence and causation requirements of gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter. 110
The court held the State met the gross negligence requirement because
the evidence in the record showed Thomas exhibited a wanton and reckless
disregard for Matrey’s life, supporting a conviction for gross negligence
Specifically, the court reasoned the
involuntary manslaughter. 111
combination of the following factors satisfied the gross negligence
requirement: (1) Thomas was knowingly selling heroin “in a region suffering
from an epidemic of heroin and opioid abuse and deaths”; (2) Thomas was
well-versed in the use of heroin and fully aware of the possibility of an
overdose; (3) Thomas sold the heroin to Matrey “without knowing anything

104. See supra Section II.B.
105. See supra Section II.B.
106. See supra Section II.D.
107. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 153, 211 A.3d 274, 285 (2019).
108. Id. at 180, 211 A.3d at 301.
109. Id. at 172, 211 A.3d at 297.
110. Id. at 152–53, 211 A.3d at 285. The mens rea requirement of gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter is gross negligence, which exists when a person exhibits a wanton and reckless
disregard for human life. See supra note 21. To meet the causation requirement, “the defendant’s
gross negligence must be the proximate cause of the victim’s death—meaning the (1) actual, butfor cause and (2) legal cause.” Thomas, 464 Md. at 174, 211 A.3d at 298. Actual cause is met when
“the result would not have happened in the absence of the conduct,” and legal cause is met when
the consequence of the defendant’s conduct is foreseeable. Id. at 174, 178, 211 A.3d at 298, 301.
111. Id. at 172, 211 A.3d at 297.
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about the composition of the heroin he sold, about what other substances
[Matrey] was taking or might have used that day, or about [Matrey’s]
tolerance given his age and recent incarceration”; and (4) “a reasonable
person in Thomas’[s] place would have understood that [Matrey] was
desperate for heroin and would have realized that increased the risk of the
transaction.” 112
In addition to the gross negligence requirement, the court also held that
the State met the causation prong, stating “there is sufficient evidence in the
record to conclude that Thomas’[s] conduct was both the actual and legal
cause of [Matrey’s] death.” 113 The court reasoned that Thomas’s actions
were the actual, but-for cause of Matrey’s death because “[w]ithout the
heroin Thomas supplied, [Matrey] would not have died.” 114 Further, the
court found Thomas’s actions to be the legal cause of Matrey’s death because
“it was eminently foreseeable that [Matrey] would use the heroin that
Thomas sold him and potentially die as a result.” 115
Thomas raised two arguments in defense as to why the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. 116
First, Thomas argued “Maryland should not recognize gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter when the defendant is accused of committing a
malum in se offense, as opposed to a malum prohibitum offense.” 117 The
court rejected this argument, explaining that the State has to prove the higher
level of culpability in prosecuting gross negligence involuntary manslaughter
regardless of whether the underlying offense is malum in se or malum
prohibitum. 118 Second, Thomas argued that the evidence introduced at trial
is insufficient to find him guilty because it does not “show the requisite
wanton disregard for human life necessary to constitute gross negligence.” 119
For the same four reasons the court relied on in holding Thomas met the gross
negligence standard, the court rejected this second argument. 120 Notably,
Thomas did not contest the State’s arguments that the “causal chain” was not
broken and that the Court of Special Appeals “incorrectly applied the same

112. Id. at 167–71, 211 A.3d at 294–96.
113. Id. at 180, 211 A.3d at 301.
114. Id. at 178, 211 A.3d at 300.
115. Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 301.
116. Id. at 161–64, 211 A.3d at 290–92.
117. Id. at 161, 211 A.3d at 290. Malum in se is defined as a “crime or an act that is inherently
immoral, such as murder, arson, or rape.” Id. at 161 n.9, 211 A.3d at 290 n.9. Malum prohibitum
is defined as an “act that is a crime merely because it is prohibited by statute, although the act itself
is not necessarily immoral.” Id. at 161 n.10, 211 A.3d at 290 n.10.
118. Id. at 163, 211 A.3d at 291.
119. Id. at 164, 211 A.3d at 292.
120. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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causation analysis to both unlawful act and gross negligence
manslaughter.” 121
In her dissent, Judge Hotten concentrated on the causation issue,
concluding the evidence presented in Thomas’s case was insufficient “to
establish a relationship between the mere sale of heroin and the subsequent
use and fatal overdose of the buyer.” 122 First, Judge Hotten argued there was
no “causal connection” between Thomas’s sale and Matrey’s use of the
heroin because “[1] the consumption occurred outside of . . . Mr. Thomas’s
presence, [2] at a different time, [3] in a different place from the completed
sale, and [4] with no other involvement from Mr. Thomas.” 123 Second, Judge
Hotten claimed the evidence does not show that the heroin, on its own, caused
Matrey’s death, considering the fact that Matrey may have consumed alcohol
in combination with heroin and tramadol, both of which convert into free
morphine when metabolized in the human body. 124 Finally, Judge Hotten
argued the majority wrongfully took the place of the Maryland General
Assembly who unambiguously elected not to pass legislation criminalizing
the conduct involved in Thomas’s case. 125
IV. ANALYSIS
In State v. Thomas, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld Thomas’s
conviction of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter after deciding that
both the gross negligence and causation prongs of the crime were satisfied. 126
The court’s holding as to gross negligence is incorrect because the court
improperly relied on other states’ precedent, and the record did not include
facts to show Thomas exhibited a “wanton and reckless disregard” for
Matrey’s life. 127 Further, despite correctly finding Thomas’s actions to be
the actual cause of Matrey’s death, the court erred in determining those
actions to also be the legal cause of his death.128 Specifically, the court did
not satisfy the requisite standard of review because it did not consider

121. Thomas, 464 Md. at 172, 211 A.3d at 297.
122. Id. at 181, 211 A.3d at 302 (Hotten, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 183–84, 211 A.3d at 304.
124. Id. at 184, 211 A.3d at 304; see supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. Despite this
fact, the majority never discussed how Matrey’s fatal overdose might have been affected by the
addition of tramadol, which, to Judge Hotten, rendered the majority’s reasoning flawed. Thomas,
464 Md. at 184, 211 A.3d at 304 (Hotten, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 188, 211 A.3d at 306. Judge Hotten explained that the General Assembly has
consistently declined to enact a bill “that would deem the distribution of heroin, fentanyl, and other
opioids, which resulted in the death of the user, a felony subject to up to 30 years imprisonment.”
Id. at 186–87, 211 A.3d at 305–06.
126. Id. at 172, 180, 211 A.3d at 297, 301 (majority opinion).
127. See infra Section IV.A.
128. See infra Section IV.B.
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additional facts in the record that, at the very least, would create reasonable
doubt in the mind of every juror that legal causation was satisfied. 129 Finally,
the court wrongfully modified existing law that the Maryland General
Assembly explicitly denied changing in 2017. 130
A. The Court Erred in Analyzing Gross Negligence Based on Another
State’s Precedent
To uphold Thomas’s conviction, the Court of Appeals improperly relied
on Commonwealth v. Catalina, and, as a result, incorrectly determined
Thomas satisfied the “wanton and reckless” requirement of gross
negligence. 131 The court, “[a]fter much consideration of precedent in
Maryland and elsewhere,” adopted the conclusion from Catalina that “the
consumption of heroin in unknown strength is dangerous to human life, and
the administering of such a drug is inherently dangerous.” 132 In its
Commonwealth v. Carrillo 133 decision, however, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts admitted “this statement is dictum,” meaning it is not now,
nor has it ever been, the Supreme Judicial Court’s view on the issue. 134
One of the major differences between Commonwealth v. Carrillo and
Commonwealth v. Catalina is the burden of proof considered in each case. 135
In Catalina, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts only considered
“whether the evidence before the grand jury supports the defendant’s
indictment for manslaughter.” 136 Carrillo, on the other hand, “is the first case
of involuntary manslaughter based on the transfer of drugs where [the
Supreme Judicial Court] address[ed] the sufficiency of the evidence to

129. See Thomas, 464 Md. at 183–84, 211 A.3d at 304 (Hotten, J., dissenting) (arguing the
majority’s holding as to causation is incorrect because of the significant number of intervening
events that occurred between Thomas’s sale of heroin and Matrey’s injection, as well as the presence
of another opiate discovered at the scene of Matrey’s death).
130. See infra Section IV.C.
131. Thomas, 464 Md. at 169–72, 211 A.3d at 295–97.
132. Id. at 169, 211 A.3d at 295 (quoting Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 980
(Mass. 1990)).
133. 131 N.E.3d 812 (Mass. 2019).
134. Id. at 822–24 (Mass. 2019) (rejecting the general proposition that “the consumption of
heroin in unknown strength is dangerous to human life, and the administering of such a drug is
inherently dangerous,” because in Catalina, unlike in Carrillo, “there was evidence that the
defendant knew he was distributing a highly potent brand of heroin, that the deceased had a low
tolerance for the drug and had overdosed in the past, that she could not handle a whole bag of this
type of heroin, and that she needed to be warned not to ‘do a whole one’” (quoting Catalina, 556
N.E.2d at 979–80)).
135. See id. at 821 (distinguishing Commonwealth v. Catalina because it considered the
sufficiency of evidence under a probable cause standard instead of a reasonable doubt standard).
136. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
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support a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 137 In Carrillo, the
defendant sold heroin to a known addict on two separate occasions over the
course of several days. 138 After the first sale, the defendant and the buyer
used the heroin together without incident. 139 Prior to the second sale a few
days later, the buyer contacted the defendant via text, stating “that his ‘veins
[were] crying’ and that he was hurting.” 140 The defendant replied, telling the
buyer he knew the buyer was “hurtin but he will very soon be in the loving
comforting arms of Miss H.” 141 Following the defendant’s second sale to the
buyer, police found the buyer deceased and determined he died from “acute
heroin intoxication.” 142 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
“that the mere possibility that the transfer of heroin will result in an overdose
does not suffice to meet the standard of wanton or reckless conduct.” 143
Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court overturned the defendant’s
conviction of involuntary manslaughter, noting “the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew, or that a reasonable person would have known, that there was a high
degree of likelihood that [the buyer] would overdose from the use of that
heroin.” 144
Despite being decided after State v. Thomas, the Carrillo decision is
instructive as to how Maryland should treat gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter stemming from drug distribution. The court in Carrillo
considered numerous factors in reaching its decision. 145 First, “the heroin in
question was not laced or tainted with fentanyl.” 146 Second, “the defendant
purchased the same brand of heroin for his own personal use.” 147 Third,
“there is no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of any other drug
or alcohol use by [the buyer] that could have increased the likelihood of an
overdose.” 148 The Supreme Judicial Court also noted there was not “any

137. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d at 821 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Auditore, 556
N.E.2d 980, 982–83 (Mass. 1990) (applying the probable cause standard in determining the
evidence was sufficient to indict the defendant for involuntary manslaughter after the defendant
distributed heroin to the victim who overdosed on the supply).
138. 131 N.E.3d at 817–18.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 818.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 816.
144. Id. at 828.
145. Id. at 819.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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expert testimony regarding the relevant potency of [the] heroin” found in the
buyer’s body. 149
Some of these same factors that acted as shields in Carrillo, however,
were used as swords in Thomas. 150 The heroin Thomas sold Matrey was pure
and was not laced with fentanyl. 151 Thomas admitted to using heroin himself
and explained to detectives that he normally uses four bags of the drug in a
single shot. 152 Further, there is no evidence that Thomas knew of other drug
or alcohol use by Matrey on the night of his death, and the record does not
provide any indication as to the potency of the heroin Thomas sold Matrey. 153
Unlike the Carrillo court’s use of such facts to argue against finding the
defendant’s conduct “wanton and reckless,” the Court of Appeals of
Maryland relied on these points in satisfying the gross negligence standard in
Thomas. 154 The court concentrated on the fact that “Thomas sold heroin to a
desperate young man” with knowledge of the drug’s dangers stemming from
Thomas’s personal use. 155 The court also argued Thomas’s lack of
knowledge about the composition of the heroin he sold to Matrey leaned in
favor of finding “wanton and reckless” disregard for life. 156
Most notably, though, is the court’s reliance on death statistics in
concluding Thomas knowingly sold heroin “in a region suffering from an
epidemic of heroin and opioid abuse and deaths.” 157 The Court of Appeals
noted, “In 2015, the year [Matrey] died, there were 1,259 deaths from alcohol
and drugs in Maryland—86% of [which] were opioid-related.” 158
Importantly, what the Court of Appeals did not mention is that the Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene defines “opioids” as including
“heroin and prescription opioid drugs such as oxycodone, hydrocodone,
hydromorphone, methadone, fentanyl, tramadol and codeine.” 159 Thomas’s

149. Id.
150. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
151. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 147, 211 A.3d 274, 282 (2019).
152. Id. at 148, 211 A.3d at 283. Notably, Thomas sold Matrey four bags of heroin on the night
of Matrey’s death. Id. at 149, 211 A.3d at 283.
153. See id. at 142–50, 211 A.3d at 279–84 (failing to provide any evidence of the potency of
the heroin Thomas sold Matrey). According to Matrey’s autopsy, the Medical Examiner concluded
Matrey “died of alcohol and narcotic (free morphine) intoxication.” Id. at 147, 211 A.3d at 282
(emphasis added).
154. Id. at 171–72, 211 A.3d at 296–97; see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
155. Thomas, 464 Md. at 171–72, 211 A.3d at 296–97.
156. Id. at 171, 211 A.3d at 296.
157. Id. at 167, 211 A.3d at 294.
158. Id. at 168, 211 A.3d at 294 (citing MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, DRUGAND ALCOHOL-RELATED INTOXICATION DEATHS IN MARYLAND, 2015, at 5 (2016),
https://bha.health.maryland.gov/OVERDOSE_PREVENTION/Documents/2015%20Annual%20R
eport_final.pdf [hereinafter MD. INTOXICATION DEATHS 2015]).
159. MD. INTOXICATION DEATHS 2015, supra note 158, at 3 (emphasis added).
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case dealt with heroin, not other opioids, so the court should have only
considered heroin-related deaths, which accounted for 59%, instead of 86%,
of alcohol- and drug-related deaths in Maryland in 2015. 160 Further, of the
heroin-related deaths in Maryland that year, 29% occurred in combination
with fentanyl, 24% in combination with alcohol, 20% in combination with
cocaine, and 13% in combination with prescription opioids. 161 Thus, only
14% of all heroin-related deaths in Maryland in 2015 were attributed solely
to heroin use. 162
The Court of Appeals also noted that in Worcester County—the
jurisdiction in which Thomas was charged—eleven heroin-related deaths
occurred in 2015. 163 The agreed statement of facts in Thomas’s case indicates
what “Detective Johns, testifying as an expert in CDS investigations, would
say at a trial—that Worcester County ‘has been consumed with heroin
overdoses, some resulting in deaths, and that these overdoses have resulted
in an acute awareness of the dangers of heroin.’” 164 Worcester County,
however, only logged eleven heroin-related deaths in 2015, attributing to
1.5% of Maryland’s total heroin-related deaths that year. 165 Additionally,
those eleven heroin-related deaths only accounted for approximately 1.7% of
all deaths in Worcester County in 2015. 166 Thus, in a region allegedly
“consumed with heroin overdoses,” heroin caused an extremely small
percentage of the total number of Worcester County and Maryland deaths in
2015. 167
Importantly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts conducted a
similar analysis in Commonwealth v. Carrillo, concentrating on national
instead of local statistics. 168 The Supreme Judicial Court noted that “in 2015,
81,326 emergency department visits occurred for ‘heroin-related poisonings’
in the United States, a year in which 12,989 individuals were reported to have

160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id.
163. Thomas, 464 Md. at 168, 211 A.3d at 295 (citing MD. INTOXICATION DEATHS 2015, supra
note 158, at 15). In 2015, Worcester County had a population of 51,540 people. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND MENTAL HYGIENE VITAL STATISTICS ADMIN., MARYLAND VITAL STATISTICS ANNUAL
REPORT 2015, at 41 (2015), https://health.maryland.gov/vsa/Documents/Reports%20and%20Data/
Annual%20Reports/2015annual_revised.pdf [hereinafter MD. VITAL STATISTICS 2015]. Of the
51,540 people in Worcester County, only 651 of them died in 2015. Id. at 148.
164. Thomas, 464 Md. at 168, 211 A.3d at 294.
165. MD. INTOXICATION DEATHS 2015, supra note 158, at 15.
166. Id.; see MD. VITAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 163, at 148 (showing 651 total deaths in
Worcester County in 2015).
167. Thomas, 464 Md. at 168, 211 A.3d at 294; see MD. INTOXICATION DEATHS 2015, supra
note 158, at 15; MD. VITAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 163, at 148.
168. 131 N.E.3d 812, 825 (Mass. 2019).
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died from drug overdoses involving heroin.” 169 Based on these statistics, the
Supreme Judicial Court assumed “that a reasonable person would know that
the use of heroin of unknown strength is inherently dangerous and carries a
significant possibility of overdose or death.” 170 After noting “the rate of
overdose substantially exceeds the rate of death,” the Supreme Judicial Court
still held one cannot “reasonably assume that all heroin of unknown strength
carries a high probability that overdose will occur, or that a reasonable
person would know that to be true.” 171 Thus, in considering Thomas’s sale
of heroin “in a region suffering from an epidemic of heroin opioid abuse and
deaths,” the Court of Appeals of Maryland should have conducted a more
accurate analysis of that region and the rest of the country, resulting in a
conclusion similar to the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in Carrillo. 172
It is true that Maryland and Massachusetts do not have identical
definitions of “wanton and reckless” conduct in the context of involuntary
manslaughter. 173 In Maryland, “wanton and reckless” conduct is “a gross
departure from the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person, without regard
to the consequences or the rights of others, and likely to bring harm at any
moment.” 174 In Massachusetts, on the other hand, “wanton and reckless”
conduct exists when it creates a “high degree of likelihood of death or grave
bodily injury.” 175 Although not identical, conduct that is “likely to bring
harm at any moment” is similar to conduct that creates a “high degree of
likelihood of death or grave bodily injury” because death and grave bodily
injury fall under the broad umbrella of the term “harm.” 176 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in relying on Catalina, misconstrued the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s view on whether an individual can be
convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the distribution of heroin because
Catalina only determined an individual can be indicted for that crime. 177
Therefore, based on this improper interpretation of Massachusetts precedent,

169. Id. (citing CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY
PREVENTION & CONTROL, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND
OUTCOMES 19 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drug-surveillancereport.pdf [hereinafter CDC 2018 DRUG REPORT]).
170. Id.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 167, 211 A.3d 274, 294 (2019); see Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d
at 825 (concluding that it is a “bridge too far” to suggest “a reasonable person would know that any
use of heroin carries a high probability or substantial likelihood of overdose or death”).
173. Thomas, 464 Md. at 171, 211 A.3d at 296; Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d at 820.
174. Thomas, 464 Md. at 171, 211 A.3d at 296 (emphasis added).
175. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d at 820.
176. Thomas, 464 Md. at 171, 211 A.3d at 296; Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d at 820. Harm is generally
defined as “to damage or injure physically or mentally.” Harm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/harm (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
177. See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
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the court upheld Thomas’s conviction by relying on factors that did not
amount to the level of gross negligence necessary to convict under the gross
negligence theory of involuntary manslaughter. 178
B. Thomas’s Sale of Heroin to Matrey Was Not the Legal Cause of
Matrey’s Death
The Court of Appeals correctly found Thomas’s actions to be the actual,
but-for cause of Matrey’s death after authorities found Matrey deceased in
his bathroom surrounded by empty “Banshee” heroin bags. 179 In reaching
this conclusion, the court properly relied on the Medical Examiner’s report,
which listed 6-Monoacetylmorphine as one of the substances found in
Matrey’s blood, indicating Matrey ingested heroin prior to his death. 180
Despite its correct analysis of actual causation, the court erred in holding
Thomas’s sale of heroin satisfied the legal causation prong of gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter. 181 Section IV.B.1 will discuss why the
Court of Appeals’ legal causation analysis is flawed based on the facts of
Thomas’s case. 182 Then, Section IV.B.2 will discuss Maryland’s assisted
suicide statute and why it calls the court’s legal causation analysis into
question. 183
1. The Court of Appeals’ Conclusion Regarding Legal Causation Is
Incorrect Considering the Facts of Thomas’s Case
Legal causation is satisfied when “the ultimate harm is one which a
reasonable man would foresee as being reasonably related to the acts of the
defendant.” 184 Matrey’s mother discovered Matrey’s body inside of a locked

178. See Thomas v. State, 237 Md. App. 527, 538, 186 A.2d 857, 864 (2018) (holding the State
only provided evidence of simple negligence, not gross negligence, when it relied on the following
facts: “(1) that the amount of heroin contained in the four bags constituted a lethal dose; (2) that
Thomas knew Matrey was an addict; (3) that Matrey was young and less experienced than Thomas;
(4) that Thomas was aware of the dangers of heroin use; and (5) that the circumstances of the sale—
in the middle of the night, after Matrey’s multiple, frantic attempts to contact Thomas—were
‘weird’”), rev’d, 464 Md. 133, 211 A.3d 274 (2019); supra notes 151–157 and accompanying text.
179. See Thomas, 464 Md. at 176–77, 211 A.3d at 299–300. “Banshee” is the strand of heroin
Thomas sold Matrey on the night of Matrey’s death. Id. at 150, 211 A.3d at 284.
180. Id. at 176, 211 A.3d at 299; ARUP LABS., DRUG PLASMA HALF-LIFE AND URINE
DETECTION
WINDOW
(2019),
https://www.aruplab.com/files/resources/painmanagement/DrugAnalytesPlasmaUrine.pdf (providing a list of opioids and their respective drug
plasma half-lives, indicating heroin is the only opioid that metabolizes into 6-Monoacetylmorphine
in the body).
181. See infra Section IV.B.1.
182. See infra Section IV.B.1.
183. See infra Section IV.B.2.
184. Thomas, 464 Md. at 178, 211 A.3d at 301 (quoting Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 441,
408 A.2d 711, 718 (1979)).
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bathroom in her house three hours after Thomas sold Matrey heroin. 185
Given Matrey was discovered alone in a bathroom locked from the inside, it
is impossible for Thomas to have injected Matrey with the heroin. 186 Further,
the Medical Examiner determined Matrey “died of alcohol and narcotic (free
morphine) intoxication,” meaning Matrey did not solely ingest heroin that
night. 187 Thus, “Mr. Thomas’s sale of heroin was not ‘reasonably related’ to
the fatal use of the substance by Mr. Matrey where the consumption occurred
outside of [sic] Mr. Thomas’s presence, at a different time, in a different place
from the completed sale,” and Matrey ingested alcohol in combination with
the heroin. 188
Despite these facts, the Court of Appeals laid heavy emphasis on the
“foreseeability of the consequence of the defendant’s conduct.” 189 In the
cases the court relies on to support its reasoning, however, the defendants
acted, or failed to act, in the presence of the victim during a continuous and
on-going event. 190 Unlike those cases, Thomas was not present when Matrey
injected the heroin, and the injection occurred at least one hour after Thomas
and Matrey engaged in their transaction. 191 More importantly, Matrey
ingested heroin in combination with alcohol, which the court provides no
evidence to suggest Thomas could have foreseen. 192 Despite Thomas
185. Id. at 141, 211 A.3d at 278.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 147, 211 A.3d at 282 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 183–84, 211 A.3d at 304 (Hotten, J., dissenting); see Editorial Staff, Mixing Heroin
& Alcohol, ALCOHOL.ORG (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.alcohol.org/mixing-with/heroin/ (“Heroin
overdose is . . . possible because using both [heroin and alcohol] together lowers the threshold at
which an individual can overdose on either drug. Unpredictable side effects or drug interactions
can occur when individuals use these drugs in combination.”); Jena Hilliard, Alcohol and Heroin,
ALCOHOL REHAB GUIDE (May 19, 2019), https://www.alcoholrehabguide.org/alcohol/drinkingdrugs/heroin/ (“Combining [alcohol and heroin] raises the odds of a user having an adverse reaction,
including a heightened risk of developing drug dependency, certain health complications, and a
possibly fatal overdose.”).
189. Thomas, 464 Md. at 178, 211 A.3d at 301 (majority opinion) (quoting Palmer v. State, 223
Md. 341, 352, 164 A.2d 467, 472 (1960) (emphasis omitted)).
190. Id.; see State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 505, 649 A.2d 336, 350–51 (1994) (holding a
police officer’s conduct satisfied the gross negligence standard after the officer pointed his shotgun
at an unarmed suspect in front of an occupied public park, racked the weapon, and fired it directly
at the suspect, killing her instantly); Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 434, 408 A.2d 711, 714 (1979)
(holding the actions of two robbers satisfied the gross negligence standard after they kidnapped two
hostages at gun point and led the police on a car chase, during which an officer shot and accidentally
killed one of the hostages); Palmer, 223 Md. at 351, 164 A.2d at 473 (finding a mother’s actions of
permitting and compelling her child to remain in a severely abusive environment at the hands of the
mother’s boyfriend satisfied the gross negligence standard).
191. See Thomas, 464 Md. at 143–44, 211 A.3d at 280 (noting Matrey’s girlfriend, who lived
at Matrey’s mother’s house with Matrey, woke up at 1:00 A.M. and noticed Matrey, who met with
Thomas around 12:00 A.M., was still not home).
192. Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 301 (arguing “[i]ngesting heroin is a foreseeable result of its
supply,” but providing no evidence that heroin is commonly combined with alcohol or that Matrey
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admitting to being a user of heroin, he never indicated that he used heroin in
combination with alcohol or other substances, or knew whether it was a
common practice. 193 Thus, even if “it was eminently foreseeable that
[Matrey] would use the heroin that Thomas sold him,” it was not foreseeable
that Matrey would combine the heroin with alcohol. 194
To rebut the above argument regarding Matrey’s combination of heroin
and alcohol, the court cited its decision in Duren v. State, arguing
“contributory negligence is not a defense to involuntary manslaughter.” 195
The court’s reliance on Duren is flawed, however, because arguing against
contributory negligence as a defense first requires the defendant to be
determined grossly negligent. 196 That said, Thomas should not have been
found grossly negligent in this case because the court wrongfully relied on
dicta from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in reaching its
conclusion. 197 Additionally, the death in Duren was far more foreseeable
than Matrey’s death in Thomas. 198 The court in Duren upheld the defendant’s
conviction for vehicular manslaughter after the defendant struck and killed a
pedestrian while traveling at a high rate of speed through a “heavily
congested residential and business area” in Baltimore City. 199 Striking a
pedestrian with a car in Baltimore City, though, where “[j]aywalking is
perhaps the most committed crime and most ignored law on [the] books,” is
statistically more likely than selling heroin to an individual who later used
the drug in combination with another deadly substance. 200
In addition to the issues of attenuation and foreseeability, the court
severely misconstrued a major part of Thomas’s case that directly affects the

had ever combined heroin and alcohol in the past (quoting Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d
973, 980 (1990))).
193. Id. at 148, 211 A.3d at 282.
194. Id. at 179, 211 A.3d at 301.
195. Id. (citing Duren v. State, 203 Md. 584, 593, 102 A.2d 277, 282 (1954)).
196. See Duren, 203 Md. at 593, 102 A.2d at 282 (“If the appellant was guilty of gross
negligence, he cannot excuse his conduct and escape the consequences by showing that the deceased
was guilty of contributory negligence.” (emphasis added)).
197. See supra Section IV.A.
198. See Duren, 203 Md. at 588–89, 102 A.2d at 279 (providing a description of the auto
accident that caused the victim’s death).
199. Id. at 588–89, 594, 102 A.2d at 279, 282.
200. Peter Hermann, Jaywalkers Can’t Abide Law of Common Sense, BALT. SUN (July 15,
2019),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2009-07-15-0907140047-story.html.
“Michael Klag, Dean of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, said at the time
that 700 pedestrians are injured by cars in Baltimore every year.” Kevin Rector, Baltimore Ranks
28th Nationally in Pedestrian Danger Study, BALT. SUN (May 20, 2014),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-pedestrian-safety-study-20140519story.html. That is over two times the number of heroin-related deaths that occurred in Baltimore
City in 2015. See MD. INTOXICATION DEATHS 2015, supra note 158, at 15 (reporting 260 heroinrelated deaths in 2015).
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legal causation analysis under the requisite standard of review. 201 Upon
searching Matrey’s bedroom, police found a bottle containing tramadol pills
that Matrey did not have a prescription for and that he “possibly had taken . . .
from his mother.” 202 This fact is vital because “both tramadol and heroin
convert into free morphine when they are metabolized in the body.” 203 The
Medical Examiner concluded that Matrey “died of alcohol and narcotic (free
morphine) intoxication,” but “[t]he manner of death could not be
determined.” 204 This indicates it is “unclear whether Matrey also ingested
tramadol, along with heroin and alcohol, and how that may have impacted
his fatal overdose.” 205 Therefore, “[t]he evidence does not establish that the
heroin was independently sufficient to cause Mr. Matrey’s death,” and “[t]he
facts cannot sustain a finding of legal, but-for causation” because this would
raise reasonable doubt in the mind of any rational trier of fact. 206
2.

Thomas Could Not Be Convicted of Assisted Suicide and
Therefore Should Not Be Convicted of Gross Negligence
Involuntary Manslaughter

Of interest to the legal causation analysis is Annotated Code of
Maryland, Criminal Law Article, section 3-102 concerning assisted
suicide. 207 Under the Thomas decision, a defendant can be found guilty of
gross negligence involuntary manslaughter for providing heroin to an
individual who overdoses, but that same defendant cannot be found guilty of
assisted suicide if the defendant provides that same heroin to an individual
who purposefully uses it to take his own life. 208 Maryland defines suicide as
“the act or instance in which an individual intentionally takes the individual’s

201. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 152, 211 A.3d 274, 285 (2019) (noting the standard of
review is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”
(quoting State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479, 649 A.2d 336, 338 (1994))).
202. Id. at 142, 211 A.3d at 279.
203. Id. at 184, 211 A.3d at 304 (Hotten, J., dissenting); see supra notes 12–13 and
accompanying text.
204. Thomas, 464 Md. at 147, 211 A.3d at 282 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 184, 211 A.3d at 304 (Hotten, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2012) (“With the purpose of
assisting another individual to commit or attempt to commit suicide, an individual may not: (1) by
coercion, duress, or deception, knowingly cause another individual to commit suicide or attempt to
commit suicide; (2) knowingly provide the physical means by which another individual commits or
attempts to commit suicide with knowledge of that individual’s intent to use the physical means to
commit suicide; or (3) knowingly participate in a physical act by which another individual commits
or attempts to commit suicide.”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (AM. LAW INST., Approved
2018) (providing an assisted suicide statute comparable to the Annotated Code of Maryland).
208. CRIM. LAW § 3-102.
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own life.” 209 To be convicted under this section, the defendant must
knowingly “cause another individual to commit suicide,” “provide the
physical means by which another individual commits” suicide, or “participate
in a physical act by which another commits suicide.” 210 This section exposes
the legal incongruity present in the court’s reasoning in Thomas: As long as
a defendant does not have knowledge that another individual is going to
commit suicide, that defendant can provide the individual with a “deadly”
object or substance and not be found guilty under section 3-102 of the
Criminal Law Article. 211 In other words, Maryland recognizes two crimes—
involuntary manslaughter and assisted suicide. 212 The former results in a
conviction when the defendant does not know the amount of a dangerous
substance the victim is going to voluntarily ingest, and the latter results in an
acquittal when a defendant does not know the amount of a dangerous
substance the victim is going to voluntarily ingest to kill himself. 213
The Court of Appeals has never considered assisted suicide cases
involving section 3-102 of the Criminal Law Article, but the court did
consider an analogous issue in Fister ex rel. Estate of Fister v. Allstate Life
Ins. Co., 214 a civil case involving section 16-215 of the Maryland Insurance
Article. 215 In Fister, the deceased had a life insurance policy that “excluded
coverage in the event that the insured, Fister, commits ‘suicide.’” 216 Fister
wanted to die, so she convinced her friend Goldman to assist her in
committing suicide by helping Fister shoot herself in the head with a
shotgun. 217 During the attempt, Fister tried pulling the trigger on her own
using a string, but she failed. 218 Goldman then accidentally pulled the trigger,
killing Fister immediately. 219 The court held, “Fister did not commit suicide
because . . . [a] conscious, thinking human being, who was in no immediate
danger or peril, made a choice to pull the trigger. As a result of that
independent choice, Fister died.” 220

209. Id. § 3-101(c) (emphasis added).
210. Id. § 3-102 (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see supra note 211 and accompanying text.
214. 366 Md. 201, 783 A.2d 194 (2001).
215. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 16-215(b)(1)(v) (LexisNexis 2017) (“[A] policy of life
insurance may contain a provision that excludes or restricts coverage for . . . death that occurs within
2 years after the date of issue of the policy as a result of suicide while sane or insane.”).
216. 366 Md. at 206, 783 A.2d at 197.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 206–07, 783 A.2d at 197.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 213–14, 783 A.2d at 201.
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The court’s decision in Fister, despite discussing a civil matter, is
helpful in considering assisted suicide in the criminal sphere. 221 Thomas
differs from Fister in that Thomas did not “pull the trigger” that caused
Matrey’s death. 222 In combination with Thomas’s lack of involvement
surrounding Matrey’s physical injection of heroin, Thomas could not have
been convicted under Maryland’s assisted suicide statute because (1) there is
no evidence to suggest Matrey intended to kill himself 223 and (2) even if that
evidence existed, Thomas would not have had any knowledge of Matrey’s
intent. 224 Despite nearly overdosing two-and-a-half years prior to his death,
Matrey continued using heroin without any indication he intended to kill
himself. 225 Further, upon learning of Matrey’s death, Thomas was shocked,
claiming there was no way Matrey could have overdosed off of only four
bags of heroin, which is the same amount Thomas normally injected for
personal use. 226 Thomas could not have been guilty in a case where Matrey,
on his own accord, ingested the heroin in an attempt to kill himself. So, how
is it just or logical to convict Thomas for Matrey’s death when Matrey, on
his own accord, ingested heroin, alcohol, and potentially tramadol on the
night of his death? 227 The answer to that question is simple—it’s not. 228
C. The Court Exceeded Its Authority by Wrongfully Ignoring the
Maryland General Assembly and Modifying Existing Law
The role of the Court of Appeals “is to ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the General Assembly, not undermine and contradict it.” 229 Over the past
several years, the Maryland General Assembly has explicitly declined to
adopt bills “that would deem the distribution of heroin, fentanyl, and other
opioids, which resulted in the death of the user, a felony subject to up to 30
years imprisonment.” 230 Notably, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill
539 in 2017, which, in its original form, “prohibit[ed] a person from
221. Id.
222. See State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133, 144, 211 A.3d 274, 280 (2019) (explaining Matrey was
found dead in a locked bathroom inside of his mother’s house).
223. See id. at 143, 211 A.3d at 279 (indicating that Matrey suffered from a heroin addiction
and, despite a non-fatal heroin overdose in the past, Matrey continued using heroin to feed his
addiction).
224. See id. at 150, 211 A.3d at 283 (discussing Thomas’s interview with police, during which
Thomas stated, “[Matrey] couldn’t have overdosed off what I sold him. I only sold him four bags.”).
225. Id. at 143, 211 A.3d at 279.
226. Id. at 150, 211 A.3d at 283; see supra note 224.
227. See supra Section IV.B.2.
228. Id.; see supra note 188.
229. Thomas, 464 Md. at 187, 211 A.3d at 306 (Hotten, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 186–87, 211 A.3d at 305–06 (citing S.B. 570, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); H.B.
1730, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2018); H.B. 612, Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2017); S.B. 303, Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2015)).
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distributing certain opioids or opioid analogues, the use of which caus[ed]
the death of another.” 231 Once signed into law by the Governor and codified
under sections 5-602 and 5-608.1 of the Maryland Criminal Law Article,
however, the bill was “amended beyond recognition.” 232
In the bill’s final form, it merely “prohibit[ed] a person from . . .
knowingly distributing a certain mixture of controlled dangerous
substances.” 233 In other words, “[t]he General Assembly has declined to pass
a bill that would create a statutory offense for the distribution of heroin and
other opioids, which result in the death of another, evidencing their intent to
not criminalize such conduct as an independent murder-related
conviction.” 234 Therefore, “[b]y holding that the State, under the facts before
us, may convict an individual of a murder-related offense for a death
connected to the distribution of heroin, the [Court of Appeals] is stepping
into the role of a policy-maker, an action in direct contravention of the
General Assembly’s unambiguous election not to pass equivalent legislation
criminalizing such conduct.” 235
Beyond going against the General Assembly’s decision not to
criminalize this type of conduct, the court’s decision to step into a policymaking role is problematic based on the significant evidence that, in general,
“putting people in prison has little to no impact on crime.” 236 This is
particularly true for drug crimes because when people get locked up for these
offenses, “there are many others desperate enough from poverty or addiction
to replace [them].” 237 Despite this, in Thomas, the State admitted in its brief
that “[d]esperate to stem the tide of deaths, law enforcement officials in
Maryland and across the country have begun charging heroin dealers with
murder-related charges in an effort to reduce the availability of the drug. The
prosecution in this case reflects those efforts.” 238 The State, however, already
231. Id. at 187, 211 A.3d at 306 (first alteration in original) (quoting S.B. 539, Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2017)).
232. Id.
233. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5-602, 5-608.1
(LexisNexis 2012)).
234. Id. at 187–88, 211 A.3d at 306.
235. Id. at 188, 211 A.3d at 306 (emphasis added).
236. See Maneka Sinha, More Prosecutions Won’t Make Baltimore Safer, BALT. SUN (Nov. 5,
2019),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-1106-hogan-frosh-20191105y42mp2y26fhz5leoyg7nd2wj34-story.html (“Many of us tend to think that locking people up will
reduce crime by pulling criminals off the street and deterring others from committing future crimes,
but research on the impact of decades of tough-on-crime policies tells us this is wrong.” (citing
DAVID
ROODMAN,
THE
IMPACTS
OF
INCARCERATION
ON
CRIME
(2017),
https://www.openphilanthropy.org/files/Focus_Areas/Criminal_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_of_i
ncarceration_on_crime_10.pdf)).
237. Id. (citing THE SENTENCING PROJECT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACTS (2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/).
238. Thomas, 464 Md. at 186, 211 A.3d at 305 (Hotten, J., dissenting).
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has an avenue to severely punish individuals who “distribute or dispense a
controlled dangerous substance” under section 5-602 of the Maryland
Criminal Law Article. 239 If found guilty under section 5-602, the law allows
the court to impose a maximum prison sentence of twenty years for the
offense. 240 In fact, that’s exactly what happened to Thomas who “was
sentenced to a twenty-year term for distribution and a concurrent 10-year
term for manslaughter.” 241 Thus, the Court of Appeals created precedent that
is unlikely to have any impact on future crime in a case where the defendant
already received a substantial sentence for heroin distribution.242
V. CONCLUSION
In State v. Thomas, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld Patrick
Thomas’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter after
Thomas distributed heroin to Colton Matrey who later overdosed on the
drug. 243 The court incorrectly held Thomas exhibited “wanton and reckless”
conduct sufficient to satisfy gross negligence. 244 Despite correctly deciding
the issue of actual causation, the court erred in finding the heroin Thomas
sold Matrey to be the legal cause of Matrey’s death. 245 Additionally, the court
should have analyzed Maryland’s assisted suicide statute in rendering its
decision because the elements of the crime call into question the logic of the
court’s legal causation analysis. 246 Finally, the Court of Appeals wrongfully
took the place of the Maryland General Assembly in extending Maryland’s
involuntary manslaughter precedent, especially in light of the General
Assembly’s explicit denial to codify gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter resulting from drug distribution in 2017. 247

239. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-602 (LexisNexis 2012) (criminalizing the
distribution or dispensing of a controlled dangerous substance).
240. MD. STATE COMM’N ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, SENTENCING GUIDELINES
OFFENSE TABLE 9 (2019), http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Guidelines/offensetable.pdf.
241. Thomas v. State, 237 Md. App. 527, 531, 186 A.3d 857, 860 (2018), rev’d, 464 Md. 133,
211 A.3d 274 (2019).
242. Id.; Sinha, supra note 236.
243. Thomas, 464 Md. at 180, 211 A.3d at 301 (majority opinion).
244. See supra Section IV.A.
245. See supra Section IV.B.1.
246. See supra Section IV.B.2.
247. See supra Section IV.C.

